Web and Internet Economics

Web and Internet Economics

9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 1-14, 2013, Proceedings
Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (Eds.)

Table of Contents
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem - Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz - Pages 1-14
Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3 - Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani, Adrian Vetta - Pages 15-23
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship - Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill - Pages 24-25
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments - Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic - Pages 26-39
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods - MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam - Pages 40-53
On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games - Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli - Pages 54-67
Trading Agent Kills Market Information - Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags - Pages 68-81
Designing Markets for Daily Deals - Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner - Pages 82-95
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies - Vincent Conitzer - Pages 96-108
The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited - José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses - Pages 109-120
Can Credit Increase Revenue? - Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos - Pages 121-133
Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling - Christoph Dürr, Lukasz Jez, Óscar C. Vásquez - Pages 134-145
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions - Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger - Pages 146-159
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions - Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis - Pages 160-173
Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare? - Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz - Pages 174-187
Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks - Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis - Pages 188-201
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design - Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis - Pages 202-215
A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes - Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Lydia Tlilane - Pages 216-229
Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox - Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen - Pages 230-231
Price of Anarchy for the N-Player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions - Xinran He, David Kempe - Pages 232-248
Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games - Martin Hoefer, Lisa Wagner - Pages 249-262
Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching - Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller, Ramamohan Paturi - Pages 263-276
Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game - Stratis Ioannidis, Patrick Loiseau - Pages 277-290
Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising - Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin - Pages 291-304
Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality - Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam - Pages 305-318
Mitigating Covert Compromises - Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags - Pages 319-332
Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments - Pinyan Lu, Lan Yu - Pages 333-346
Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects - Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos - Pages 347-360
Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness - Ruta Mehta, Milind Soho